MessageBird Financial Model

• APIs for Telecommunication covering three product lines: Messaging (SMS), Voice, and Video/Data.
• Core differentiator is proprietary intelligent routing engine ("Trifecta of Routing") - optimises across Quality, Speed, and Price simultaneously.
• Infrastructure layer: own Points of Presence (POPs), SS7/SMPP/VPN direct carrier connections, number lookup and routing lookup services. Flow illustrated via "a day in the life of an Uber message" with 7 routing paths to Indonesian carriers.
• Bootstrapped to profitability without external capital.

2020 market size estimates (bubble chart, slide 7):

• Mobile Telecom TAM: $1T
• VoIP: $130B
• MVNO: $75B
• Messaging (addressable for MessageBird's current core): $34.3B

No SAM or SOM breakdown provided. No growth rate cited for any segment.

• Usage-based API pricing: customers pay per message/call routed through the platform.
• No per-seat or subscription component mentioned.
• Channels: self-serve (implied by sign-up cohort chart going back to 2007) + enterprise sales (Uber, DoorDash, Google named as customers).
• Use cases cited: 2FA (Google), Driver Acquisition (Uber), Delivery notifications (DoorDash).
• Gross margin not stated; as a routing/CPaaS business, carrier termination costs are the primary COGS.

• Run rate revenue: $75M USD at time of deck.
• Bootstrapped and profitable.
• Revenue Year over Year (slide 9): curve is flat/slow 2011–2014, acceleration from 2015, sharp inflection in 2016, with two upside-case dashed projections for 2017E; no Y-axis dollar labels on chart - exact annual figures not readable.
• Net Revenue Expansion Rate (slide 10): quarterly data 2016-Q1 through 2017-Q1; range ~125%–175%; Q1-2016 ≈125%, Q3-2016 ≈155%, Q4-2016 ≈143%, Q1-2017 ≈173%. All above 100% = strong negative churn / expansion.
• Revenue by Sign-Up Cohort - SMS Revenue (slide 11): stacked area 2014–2016; cohorts back to 2007; largest bands are 2011 (red) and 2016 (orange, top band) suggesting both strong legacy retention and rapid new cohort ramp. No Y-axis dollar values readable.
• Customers: DoorDash, Google, Uber named; no total customer count given.

• Net Revenue Expansion Rate: ~125%–175% range (2016–2017Q1). - implies negative net churn; existing customers grow faster than any churn.

• Competitive moat framed as the "Trifecta of Routing" - proprietary routing engine simultaneously optimising Quality, Speed, and Price.
• Own infrastructure (POPs, direct SS7 carrier connections) is the structural barrier - replicating direct carrier relationships is capital- and time-intensive.
• Twilio is the obvious implied competitor (not named in deck).
• No direct competitor logos or analysis slide present.

• Team slide not present; team branding referred to internally as "birds" ("global team of birds").
• No funding amount or valuation stated.
• Use of funds (expansion plan slide 12):
• Dedicated SDR, AE, CSM sales teams
• 3x sales headcount across US, APAC, Europe
• M&A opportunities
• Investment in low-level infrastructure
• Brand awareness and reach

• Archetype + why: Usage-based CPaaS revenue model with cohort-driven expansion. MessageBird is a volume-based API business where revenue = messages/calls × price per unit, with strong net revenue retention (>100%) making a cohort NRR model the right spine. Supports a lightweight 3-statement P&L overlay given they are profitable.

• Forecast horizon & granularity: 3 years (2017–2019), monthly for Year 1, quarterly for Years 2–3. Deck is ~2017 vintage so anchor to the $75M run rate baseline.

• Key drivers & assumptions:
• Starting ARR / run rate revenue: $75M
• New cohort revenue ramp: model new sign-up cohorts growing at 50–80% YoY based on visible cohort acceleration in slide 11
• Net Revenue Expansion Rate on existing cohorts: ~150% annualised (midpoint of 125%–175% quarterly range)
• Gross margin: ~30–40%; CPaaS businesses carry significant carrier termination COGS; Twilio comparable ~50–55% gross margin used as ceiling; MessageBird's own routing infrastructure may improve margin vs. pure resellers
• Headcount growth: 3x sales headcount; current sales team ~30–50 people → grows to 90–150 over 2 years
• OpEx / S&M as % of revenue: ~25–35% post-fundraise, typical for CPaaS growth phase
• Infrastructure capex: material but not quantified; treat as % of revenue ~5–8% for CapEx
• Churn: implied near-zero given NRR >100%; model gross churn at ~5–10% annually
• Pricing per message/call: blended ~$0.004–$0.006/SMS (industry standard range); voice higher
• Message volume implied: $75M run rate ÷ ~$0.005 blended = ~15B messages/year
• New product revenue (Voice, Video, Data): 10–15% of total revenue today, growing faster than SMS
• M&A: flagged as a use of funds; model as a separate line / sensitivity rather than baking in

• Scenarios (Base / Bull / Bear - which variables flex):
• Base: NRR stays ~150%, new cohort growth +60% YoY, GM ~35%
• Bull: NRR expands to 175% (2017-Q1 trajectory), new cohort growth +80%, successful M&A adds 1–2 product lines
• Bear: NRR compresses to 120% (competition, pricing pressure), new cohort growth +30%, carrier cost pressure holds GM at 28%

• Required sheets / outputs:

1. Assumptions dashboard (all drivers in one place)
2. Cohort model - annual sign-up cohorts, per-cohort revenue with NRR expansion applied
3. Revenue build - SMS, Voice, Other by quarter
4. P&L - gross profit, S&M, R&D, G&A, EBITDA
5. Headcount plan (by function: Engineering, Sales/SDR/AE/CSM, Ops, G&A)
6. Cash flow / runway (company is self-funded; model should show cash generation, not just P&L)
7. Scenario toggle (Base / Bull / Bear)
8. KPI summary: NRR, message volume, revenue per cohort, gross margin